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1 Introduction
Fiscal equalization programs represent an important feature of public sector finance in
many states with multiple levels of government (Blo¨chliger and Charbit, 2008; OECD,
2013). Since, generally, the local tax bases and the local public expenditure needs
are not uniformly distributed over the territories of the state, fiscal equalization aims
at reducing such gaps, thereby limiting the disparities in terms of net fiscal benefits
for similar individuals living in different regions. However, the gains in terms of eq-
uity stemming from fiscal equalization must be confronted with its costs in terms of
efficiency, since the transfer mechanism can distort the local governments’ tax and
expenditure decisions, as well as the location choices of individuals and firms.
The literature on fiscal equalization can be divided into two main strands. The
first examines, at a general level, the assignment of the allocative and distributive
functions between the central and the sub-national governments, and the role of inter-
governmental transfer programs. This literature can be traced back to the works of
Buchanan and Goetz (1972), Flatters et al. (1974), Boadway and Flatters (1982), where
emphasis is given to inefficiencies in the allocation of the population as a consequence of
fiscal externalities in the presence of perfect mobility of the population. In this setting,
the role of transfers is to internalize the fiscal externalities. More recent contributions,
e.g. Dahlby (1996), Sato (2000) and Albouy (2012), extend the previous models by
assuming imperfect mobility of the population and distortionary taxation. The analysis
of the optimal design of grant schemes based on the equalization of the social marginal
cost of raising tax revenue across jurisdictions is due to Dahlby and Wilson (1994),
while Gordon and Cullen (2011) examine the interplay between redistribution policies
at the central and at the local level.
The second strand of the literature is more policy-oriented and examines the func-
tioning of particular forms of fiscal equalization schemes that are used in practice.
Among these, the grants aimed at fiscal-capacity equalization receive a great deal of
attention, since, as we document in Section 2, programs of this kind are implemented
both in federal and unitary states. Fiscal capacity equalization can be based either on
standard tax revenues (tax-base equalization) or on actual tax revenues (tax-revenue
equalization). While tax-base equalization is usually employed when local governments
have ample tax autonomy, including the power to freely set tax rates, tax-revenue equal-
ization is employed when tax autonomy is limited, with tax rates decided at the central
level and local governments concurring to tax collection. Focusing on the representative
tax system (RTS) equalization scheme for the Canadian Provinces, Smart (1998) offers
a clear theoretical analysis of the incentive effects of tax-base equalization, by which
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a local jurisdiction is entitled to a grant that depends on the difference between the
national-average and its own per capita standard tax revenues. Since the latter, which
depend on the actual tax bases, are a decreasing function of the actual tax rates, the
equalization program gives the local governments an incentive to obtain more grants by
raising their tax rates. Of the opposite sign are the incentives provided by tax-revenue
equalization, since when a local government reduces its fiscal effort, by reducing its
own tax revenues it increases the equalization grant, which is based on the gap be-
tween average and own actual tax revenues. The empirical works by Esteller-More´
and Sole´-Olle´ (2002) and Smart (2007) for Canada, and Buettner (2006) for Germany,
generally confirm the relevance of the incentives that tax-base equalization gives to set
excessively high tax rates at the local level, while Baretti et al. (2002) show that the
German interstate transfer system, based on tax revenues, discourages fiscal effort by
local governments on tax administration and enforcement.
Following this line of research, some authors have observed that the distorting
incentives of fiscal equalization should be confronted with those arising from horizontal
tax competition among local governments. The focus of the analysis then becomes that
of investigating whether and to what extent the two kinds of distortions reciprocally
offset (see, e.g., Ko¨thenbuerger, 2002, and Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006, for theoretical
analysis; Rizzo, 2008, also includes an empirical test). If taxation at the local level is
inefficiently low because of tax competition, then tax base equalization turns out to be
good both for equity, by redistributing from low to high fiscal capacity regions, and for
efficiency, by providing incentives to raise local tax rates.
The perspective taken in the above studies is chiefly a normative one, with policy
makers behaving as benevolent social welfare maximizers. However, it is well known
that actual policy making is also driven by the incentives provided by political insti-
tutions. Taking up this point, the main purpose of the present work is to further the
understanding of the functioning of fiscal equalization programs by allowing for a more
comprehensive view of the motivations of policy makers; namely, one that includes
not only the concern for social welfare but also that for political support by special
interest groups. Note, however, that although we frame the activities of the special
interest groups using the popular political influence approach developed by Bernheim
and Whinston (1986a, 1986b), the scope of our results extends to other forms of cit-
izens’ influence on fiscal choices (e.g., Brusco et al., 2014), as well as to situations
in which public policies are driven by electoral concerns, like in probabilistic voting
settings (e.g., Hettich and Winer, 1988, Dixit and Londregan, 1998).
Linking our theoretical analysis to the practice of fiscal equalization, where equal-
ization at uniform rates on an array of fiscal capacity measures is usually observed,
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another purpose of the present work is to compare uniform and differentiated patterns
of equalization rates on local fiscal capacity measures, so as to shed light on the reasons
why uniformity is the prevalent practice.
We proceed in two steps. Firstly, we let taxpayers, organized as special interest
groups, lobby policy makers at the local level with the purpose to gain a more favor-
able tax treatment, and thus examine, from a normative perspective, how the central
government should optimally adjust the equalization program to account for lobbying
induced distortions of local fiscal policies. Secondly, we let taxpayers lobby also the
policy maker at the central level and thus describe, from a positive perspective, how
the equalization policy can be distorted by lobbying. This allows us to finally examine
the normative question about whether it is better, in terms of social welfare, to let the
central policy maker differentiate the equalization rates on the various fiscal capacity
measures, or force her to set uniform rates (by means, say, of a legal provision).
To analyze the above issues, we set up a simple public finance model, in which
the local authorities finance their public expenditure by taxing incomes accruing to
two types of production factors. The latter, organized as distinct lobby groups, try
to influence policy making. We abstract from differences in fiscal needs or service-cost
provision at the local level, while we allow for differentiated fiscal capacities, and we
consider tax-base equalization transfers, initially of horizontal type, then of vertical
type. In order to focus the analysis on the incentives provided by fiscal equalization
on local policies influenced by lobbying, we assume that the locally taxed production
factors are immobile. However, as we illustrate in an online Appendix, our results are
robust to the introduction of tax competition ensuing from factors’ mobility.
We find that it is important to account for politically induced distortions, for tax
base elasticities, and for fiscal capacities gaps between rich and poor jurisdictions, in
the design of fiscal equalization transfers. If lobbying occurs only at the local level by
distorting tax setting, while the central policy maker maximizes social welfare, then,
ceteris paribus, optimality requires a high (low) equalization rate for the tax base backed
by the strong (weak) lobby group. The explanation is simple. Since local governments
are on the increasing side of their Laffer curve, tax-base equalization, by fostering tax
rates and local tax revenues, increases inter-regional redistribution. However, because
of lobbying, taxation is distorted downward for the strong lobby group and upward for
the weak one. Hence, equalization of the tax base backed by the weak lobby group is
costly in terms of efficiency, since it gives incentives to local governments to raise an
already upward-distorted tax rate. On the contrary, equalization of the tax base backed
by the strong lobby group is good for efficiency, since it gives incentives to raise a tax
rate that is below its optimal level. Hence, while equalization of tax revenues accruing
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from the weak lobby group faces an efficiency-equity trade-off, that on tax revenues
accruing from the strong lobby group is beneficial for both equity and efficiency.
As for the other economic factors, we show that the optimal equalization rates are
(i) a decreasing function of tax base elasticities, as a high elasticity implies a large excess
burden of inter-regional transfers based on the equalization of local tax revenues, and
(ii) an increasing function of the fiscal capacity gaps between rich and poor jurisdictions,
as a large gap means large benefits ensuing from inter-regional redistribution. These
results closely parallel classical findings in optimal tax theory in the context of personal
income and commodity taxation.
If taxpayers lobby also at the central level, we find that the central authority is
induced to reduce the equalization rates on all tax bases if the lobby groups are similar
in terms of lobbying power. If, instead, the two groups are highly heterogeneous in
terms of lobbying power, the central policy maker is led to distort downward (upward)
the equalization rate on the tax base backed by the strong (weak) lobby group. In the
latter situation, uniform equalization, albeit sub-optimal, performs better, in terms of
social welfare, than differentiated equalization highly distorted by lobbying.
The equity-efficiency trade-off affecting inter-regional redistribution, as well as some
aspects of the political determinants of the transfer policies, have already been exam-
ined in the literature on fiscal federalism, but never jointly, as we do in this paper, and
with a focus on issues that are different from ours. Lockwood (1999) and Bordignon
et al. (2001) analyze redistribution among regions in a setting of asymmetric informa-
tion in which, because of moral hazard and adverse selection, the optimal equalization
transfers are second best. Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008) examine how fiscal capac-
ity equalization impacts on the accountability of local politicians. The importance of
political incentives on the allocation of grants is stressed by a line of empirical research:
Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) focus on electoral incentives, while Levitt and Snyder
(1995), Larcinese et al. (2006), and Sole´-Olle´ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), examine
the partisan alignment hypothesis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the relevance
of our theoretical analysis for fiscal equalization in practice. Section 3 presents the
theoretical framework. Section 4 examines the normative aspects of horizontal equal-
ization when lobbying occurs only at the local level. Section 5 introduces lobbying at
the central level of government. Section 6 briefly examines fiscal equalization of vertical
type, leaving all technical details to an online Appendix. Section 7 concludes.
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2 Relation to fiscal equalization in practice
In a recent study by the OECD (2013, Table 5.2, p. 107), the revenue equalization
programs used around the world are classified according to three dimensions.
The first dimension refers to the direction, horizontal or vertical, of the transfers.
With horizontal equalization, the local jurisdictions with above-average fiscal capacity
directly subsidize those with below-average capacity. Instead, with vertical equaliza-
tion, the transfers to local jurisdictions are financed by an upper layer of government,
which is usually the central one. The second dimension distinguishes between equal-
ization of actual tax revenues collected and equalization of standard tax revenues, as
we have already described in Section 1. Finally, the third dimension of classification
refers to the rate of equalization of fiscal capacities, which determines the degree of
inter-regional redistribution (a 100% equalization rate corresponds to ‘full progressiv-
ity’), as well as the intensity of the incentive effects provided by the transfer program
on tax setting and administration by local governments. In principle, the equalization
rates can be differentiated along two dimensions: with respect to the distance between
actual fiscal capacity and its average value, and with respect to the type of tax revenues
subjected to equalization (if, as it is common practice, equalization is based on an array
of fiscal capacity measures).
Among the sixteen revenue equalization programs classified in the OECD study,
seven belong to federal/regional, and nine to unitary, states. With the exception of
the German inter-state equalization program, which is of mixed type, all federal states
(Australia, Austria, Canada, Italy, Spain, Switzerland) employ vertical equalization,
while four unitary states use horizontal equalization (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Swe-
den) and the others use a vertical scheme (Greece, Poland, Portugal, Turkey, United
Kingdom). But for Finland and Poland, unitary states equalize actual tax revenues,
whereas the equalization of standard tax revenues is more common in federal countries.
In most schemes the equalization rates are a decreasing function of per capita
fiscal capacity, though the observed patterns are highly heterogeneous. In Sweden,
for instance, equalization is almost uniform (85% for municipalities above 115% of
average fiscal capacity, 95% for those below it). In other countries, the rates are highly
differentiated: in Canada and Austria, for instance, the equalization rate is zero for
jurisdictions with above-average fiscal capacity, while it is positive for jurisdictions with
below-average capacity (50-100% in Canada, 85% in Austria); in Finland the rate is
40% for municipalities above 90% of average fiscal capacity, 100% for those below it. In
our theoretical analysis, we first consider a horizontal equalization system with rates of
equalization that are uniform with respect to per capita fiscal capacity (i.e., a program
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that is similar to the one employed in Sweden), and then examine a vertical program
in which only jurisdictions with below-average fiscal capacity cash the equalization
transfer (i.e., a scheme that is similar to the one used in Canada).
All countries considered in the OECD study apply instead uniform equalization
rates on the various tax revenues subjected to equalization.1 And this is where our
theoretical analysis can help to judge whether this kind of arrangement is optimal or
not. We find that uniform equalization is in general not optimal, provided that the
choice of the equalization rates is made by a benevolent decision maker (see Section
4.2, Proposition 1). A differentiated equalization structure is useful if tax setting at the
local level is distorted by the influence of special interest groups,2 if the tax elasticities
of the equalized tax bases are not uniform (e.g., incomes are more elastic than housing
property values), or if the geographical dispersion of the various tax bases is not uniform
(e.g., income is usually more unequally distributed than consumption). Instead, if
not only tax setting at the local level, but also the choice of the equalization rates
at the central level, are distorted by lobbying, then our analysis shows that uniform
equalization, as observed in practice, can be a better arrangement than differentiated
equalization (see Section 5.2, Proposition 3).
3 The model
Consider an economy whose public sector is composed of the central government and
a large number of small local jurisdictions (e.g., municipalities). There are two types
of localities, indexed by j = 1, 2, equal in number, J > 1 for each type. The small ju-
risdictions assumption implies that each locality takes as given the national aggregates
(average tax rates and tax bases) of the equalization mechanism when setting its own
fiscal policy (see Section 4.1).
In both types of localities, a private good is produced by means of a linear technology
that uses two types of inputs, labelled i = a, b, each one supplied by a different type of
agent. All agents of a given type i have identical preferences and endowments; instead,
their productivity can be different in the two types of localities. We assume that the
localities are inhabited by immobile agents, i.e., by individuals supplying their own
production factor only in their locality of residence. We show that our results are
1The only exception is Canada, where all standard tax revenues are equalized at 100% for the
recipient Provinces (those with below-average fiscal capacity), whereas actual revenues from natural
resources are equalized at 50%. The reason is that with full equalization the public authorities of the
territories in which the resources are located would have no appropriate incentives for their development.
2See Esteller-More´ et al. (2012) for anecdotal evidence of lobbying by the tobacco and oil industries
in the US to influence policy choices about excise taxes on the sale of their products.
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robust to production factors’ mobility in an online Appendix to this article.
In both types of localities, the local government taxes production factors’ incomes
to provide a public good, which is produced using a technology that transforms one
unit of the private good into one unit of the public good. The private good serves also
the role of consumption good and that of numeraire good. All markets are perfectly
competitive.
3.1 Factors’ supplies
All agents are endowed with an exogenous amount, normalized to unity, of a good
that can be either directly consumed or supplied as a production factor. For a type-i
agent resident in a type-j locality, the endowment constraint is hij + xij = 1, where
hij ≥ 0 is the quantity directly consumed and xij ≥ 0 is the quantity supplied for
production. Let pij be the gross market price of production factor i in a type-j locality.
Since markets are perfectly competitive, by linearity of the production function, pij
is constant and equal to the (exogenously given) marginal productivity of production
factor i in a type-j locality. Gross income, yij = pijxij, is taxed at a proportional rate
tij ∈ [0, 1]. The individual budget constraint is then equal to cij = (1 − tij)yij, where
cij is the consumption good purchased in the market (the output, and numeraire, good,
defined above).
Preferences of a type-i agent for consumption bundles (cij , hij) are represented by
the utility function:
ui(cij , hij) = cij + φ
i(hij), (1)
where the strictly concave function φi(.) represents the utility of direct consumption
of the endowment. Quasi linearity of the utility function (1) implies that all income
effects fall on the demand for market consumption.3
Taking tij and pij as given, the representative type-i individual solves:
max
xij
(1− tij)pijxij + φ
i(1− xij). (2)
Denote with φih and φ
i
hh the first- and the second-order derivatives of φ
i, respec-
tively. The equilibrium factor supply, x˜ij(pij, tij), that solves problem (2) is defined by
the first order condition:
(1− tij)pij = φ
i
h(1− xij). (3)
3The quasi-linearity assumption is made for analytical convenience and can be relaxed. For some
types of production factors, the empirical estimates of the impact of income taxes on their supply find
weak income effects (see, e.g., Gruber and Saez, 2002, for the case of labor supply).
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To ensure an interior solution, x˜ij ∈ (0, 1), assume that limxij→1 φ
i
h(1−xij) = +∞,
φih(1) = 0. Factor’s supply is increasing in pij, ∂x˜ij/∂pij = −(1−tij)/φ
i
hh(h˜ij) > 0, and
decreasing in tij , ∂x˜ij/∂tij = pij/φ
i
hh(h˜ij) < 0. To simplify the analysis, we assume
that the elasticity of factors’ supply, εi > 0, is constant. Then:
∂x˜ij
∂tij
= −
x˜ijεi
1− tij
< 0. (4)
By inserting the equilibrium quantities into Eq. (1), the indirect utility function of
a type-i agent resident in a type-j locality is:
vij(tij) = (1− tij)pij x˜ij + φ
i (1− x˜ij) , (5)
where, by applying the envelope theorem, it is:
∂vij
∂tij
= −pijx˜ij < 0. (6)
The supply of production factors modelled above can be interpreted in familiar ways.
If the endowment is expressed in units of time, and xij is labor time, hij is leisure time,
and pij is the wage rate, then one obtains the standard neoclassical model of labor
supply. As another example, consider a two-period framework with an endowment
that in the first period can be allocated to consumption, hij , and investment, xij . Let
pij be the second-period return of investment (including the principal). Then, in the
absence of second-period bequests, cij is second-period consumption, and the model
can be interpreted as one of capital supply.
Note that, strictly speaking, the use of distortionary income taxes is unjustified in
the present setup. Since taxpayers are divided into two distinct, and observable, groups
of identical agents, the efficient instrument would be a uniform lump sum tax — if the
only objective is public good financing, or a pair of group-specific lump sum taxes —
if also some degree of between-groups redistribution is deemed as desirable. However,
the aim of this paper is not that of justifying the use of second-best distortionary taxes
in place of first-best lump sum instruments, which is usually the focus of optimal tax
models. Instead, the objective is the analysis of the efficiency and equity properties
of transfer programs that are based on the equalization of fiscal capacities of local
governments financing their own public services with distortionary taxes; to this end,
and to avoid unnecessary analytical complications, we use a simple two-group, identical-
agents, setup.
3.2 Type-1 (‘poor’) and type-2 (‘rich’) localities
In both types of localities, there is an equal mass, ni > 0, i = a, b, of agents of
each type, na + nb = 1. The only source of heterogeneity between type-1 and type-2
8
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localities is production factors’ productivity. In particular, we assume that both types
of production factors are more productive in type-2 localities than in type-1.
Assumption 1 Both types of production factors are more productive in type-2 than in
type-1 localities. That is, pi1 < pi2, i = a, b.
The obvious implication of this hypothesis, formally characterized in Section 4.2, is that
social welfare is higher in type-2 (‘rich’) than in type-1 (‘poor’) localities, providing a
rationale for inter-regional redistribution by means of a fiscal equalization program.
3.3 Tax revenues and equalization grants
Let
z¯kj(tkj) = nkpkjx˜kj, z¯k(tk1, tk2) =
1
2
2∑
r=1
z¯kr, (7)
be the per capita tax base of production factor k in a type-j jurisdiction, and the
national per capita tax base of production factor k, respectively.
Let tj = (taj , tbj), t = (t1, t2). In a type-j jurisdiction, the per capita tax revenues
are equal to:
Tj(tj) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
tkj z¯kj . (8)
The per capita equalization grant takes the following form:
Ej(t) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
θk t¯k (z¯k − z¯kj) , (9)
where:
t¯k(tk1, tk2) =
∑
2
r=1 tkrz¯kr∑
2
r=1 z¯kr
, (10)
is the national average tax rate on production factor k’s income.
The transfer mechanism defined in Eq. (9) is based on the equalization of fiscal
capacities, measured by the standard tax bases. The parameters θ = (θa, θb), θk ≥ 0,
k = a, b, are the equalization rates, expressing the degree of tax-base equalization.
The formula of the equalization scheme shows that, for production factor k, given
the national per capita tax base, z¯k, and the national average tax rate, t¯k, the grant
to a type-j locality covers the share θk of the gap between the standardized national
per capita tax revenue, t¯kz¯k, and its standardized per capita tax revenue, t¯kz¯kj. As
9
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described in Section 2, this equalization system is of horizontal type, since the transfers
cashed by the ‘recipient’ jurisdictions (those with below-average fiscal capacity) are fi-
nanced by the ‘donor’ jurisdictions (those with above-average fiscal capacity), and in
the aggregate total transfers sum up to zero. In contrast, the vertical system that we
examine in Section 6 is of vertical type, since positive transfers are paid only to juris-
dictions with below-average fiscal capacity, with financing by the central government.
The tax-setting incentives provided by the transfer mechanism are clear. From the
point of view of a single jurisdiction, an increase in its own tax rate tkj determines,
ceteris paribus, an increase in the grant, since the per capita tax base z¯kj is decreasing in
tkj. That is, the equalization program gives incentives to local governments to expand
taxation, an issue clearly exposed by Smart (1998).
Note also that, in principle, the transfers depend not only on the tax rates set by
the receiving jurisdiction, but also on those set by all other jurisdictions, since the
latter affect the national per capita tax bases, z¯k, and the national average tax rates,
t¯k, k = a, b. However, recall that we are focusing the analysis on a large number of
small local jurisdictions of each type. This implies that any single jurisdiction takes
the average values (z¯k, t¯k) as exogenously given when setting its own fiscal policy. That
is, any given type-j jurisdiction perceives the impact of a change in its own tax rate tij
on the equalization transfer as being equal to:
∂Ej
∂tij
= z¯ijθi
(
t¯iεi
1− tij
)
. (11)
In a type-j jurisdiction, per capita public good supply is equal to its per capita
public resources, Tj +Ej. By differentiating Eq. (8), and combining with Eq. (11), we
obtain:
∂Tj
∂tij
+
∂Ej
∂tij
= z¯ij
(
1−
tij − θit¯i
1− tij
εi
)
. (12)
3.4 Social welfare
Welfare of a type-i agent supplying her own production factor in a type-j locality is:
wij(t) = vij(tij) + γ [Tj(tj) + Ej(t)] , (13)
where vij is the utility of private consumption, defined in Eq. (5), and γ > 1 is the
marginal utility of public expenditure, which is assumed to be constant and exogenously
given.4
4The analysis can be generalized, albeit at the cost of some analytical complexity, to the case in
which the marginal benefits of the public good are a decreasing function of public expenditure.
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Using a Utilitarian criteria to aggregate the individual utilities, social welfare in a
type-j jurisdiction is defined as:
Wj(t) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
nkwkj(t). (14)
3.5 Taxpayers’ lobbying
We frame taxpayers’ lobbying activities within the conventional ‘buying influence’ ap-
proach, originally conceived by Bernheim and Whinston (1986a, 1986b) and then fur-
ther developed by Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001) and Dixit et al. (1997). In each
locality, we setup a perfect-information common-agency game with three players: two
principals (the lobbyists, each one representing the interests of one group of taxpayers)
and one agent (the local policy maker). Interest groups compete to sway tax policy to
their advantage by openly offering legal monetary rewards (in the form, for instance,
of campaign contributions) to the policy maker.
Formally, the game presents two stages. In the first, the taxpayers’ lobbyists an-
nounce to the policy maker a menu of monetary offers which are contingent on fiscal
policies. Following acceptance of the offers, in the second stage the policy maker takes
her preferred choice under the influence of the incentives provided by lobbyists. The
game can be solved backward using the notion of subgame perfection.
Following Dixit et al. (1997), we assume that the contribution function presented
by a lobbyist to the policy maker is of the truthful, or compensating, type. A truthful
contribution is a continuous function of the policy instruments that is defined along an
indifference curve of the lobbyist; hence, a change in a policy instrument determines
a change in the contribution offered to the policy maker that reflects one-to-one the
impact of the policy change on the lobbyist’s welfare. Truthful contributions are a
helpful device for solving this class of common agency games, since the set of the best
responses of each principal to the contribution functions (not necessarily truthful) of
the other principals always contains a truthful contribution schedule (Dixit et al., 1997,
Proposition 2). This also implies that there is no need to bother about whether it is
worthwhile or not for a group to lobby, since lobbying is always a dominant strategy.
Hence, there is no loss of generality in using this type of contribution functions. More-
over, with truthful contributions the equilibrium of the game is often unique, while in
general common agency games admit multiple equilibria.
In a type-j locality, the truthful contribution function offered by lobby group i is:
Qij(t;λi, pˆiij) = λimax
{
0, niwij(t)− Πˆij
}
, (15)
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where Πˆij ≥ 0 is a scalar representing the net payoff of the lobby group. The parameter
λi ∈ [0, 1] represents a measure of the effectiveness of group i in its lobbying activity:
the group is fully powerful if λi = 1; it is completely ineffective if λi = 0. Following the
literature quoted above, we do not model how a group organizes its lobbying activity in
order to provide its members with the incentives to pursue the common interest and to
overcome free riding behavior. We simply assume the existence of a lobbyist for each
group of taxpayers, with an exogenously given ‘capacity’ to influence policy making,
as represented by the parameter λi. Note also that the absolute and relative lobbying
power of groups a and b is the same in both types of localities, since, as assumed in
Section 3.2, the only source of heterogeneity between rich and poor localities is factors’
productivity.
To ease the presentation of the results, we also assume, without loss of generality,
that one of the two groups is always (weakly) more powerful than the other one in
lobbying.
Assumption 2 Group a is always less powerful, at most equally powerful, than group
b in lobbying. That is, λa ≤ λb.
The local policy maker cares both for social welfare, defined in Eq. (14), and for
political contributions, defined in Eq. (15). Her objective function is assumed to be
linearly additive, with uniform weights, in the two components. Ignoring the non-
negativity constraint on the contribution functions, the objective function of the local
policy maker in the second stage of the lobby game can be written as:5
Ωj(t) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
nk(1 + λk)wkj(t). (16)
By looking at Eq. (16), we immediately note that political pressures impact on fiscal
policy only if groups a and b are not equally effective in lobbying (i.e., if λa 6= λb), so
that the policy maker ends up maximizing a ‘distorted’ social welfare function. Instead,
if the two groups are equally effective in lobbying (i.e., if λa = λb), then lobbying does
not impact on fiscal policy.
5The lobby game can be solved by first computing the equilibrium in the policy variables at the
second stage by maximizing Eq. (16), which ignores the non-negativity constraints on political contri-
butions. The latter can then be checked ex-post, after having computed the equilibrium net payoffs of
the lobby groups, (Πˆ∗aj, Πˆ
∗
bj), at the first stage of the game. However, in the present work we do not
solve for the first stage of the game, since we are not interested in the distributional effects of lobbying
due to the monetary transfers from the lobby groups to the policy maker. We focus only on the second
stage of the game, where lobbying impacts on fiscal policy in terms of efficiency and inter-regional
redistribution.
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Note also that the objective function (16) is compatible with a political setting in
which tax policy is driven by electoral competition instead of by special interest groups.
In particular, an objective function similar to that shown in Eq. (16) can be obtained
within a standard probabilistic voting model in which two parties run for election with
the aim of maximizing their vote share, with voters of groups a and b ideologically
dispersed in favor of one of the two parties. The weight λk then would represent a
measure of the ‘political clout’ of group k, as a function of the mass of its swing voters
(see Persson and Tabellini, 2000, for a textbook exposition of the probabilistic voting
model, and Dixit and Londregan, 1996, for an application to redistributive tax policy).
4 The design of fiscal equalization
In this section, we first derive the fiscal policies set by local governments under the
influence of taxpayers’ lobbying and of equalization transfers, and then characterize
the optimal structure of the fiscal equalization program.
4.1 Equilibrium local fiscal policies
Consider a type-j jurisdiction. The local policy maker maximizes the objective func-
tion defined in Eq. (16) with respect to the own tax rates tj, taking as given the
other jurisdictions’ tax rates and the average tax rates, and tax bases, at the national
level. For a type-j locality, the first order conditions are (we examine the second order
conditions at the end of the section):
∂Ωj
∂tij
= −ni(1 + λi)pij x˜ij + γ
(
∂Tj
∂tij
+
∂Ej
∂tij
) ∑
k∈{a,b}
nk(1 + λk) = 0, i = a, b. (17)
Defining λ¯ = naλa + nbλb, and using Eq. (12), Eq. (17) can be manipulated to
obtain:
tij − θit¯i
1− tij
=
γ − (1 + λi)/(1 + λ¯)
γεi
, j = 1, 2, i = a, b. (18)
In principle, the equilibrium local fiscal policies of the federation are defined by a
system of 4J equations in the 4J tax rates set by the 2J jurisdictions. However, since
the J jurisdictions of type j, j = 1, 2, are identical, we can focus on the symmetric
equilibria in which all jurisdictions of the same type set the same fiscal policy. This
reduces the 4J-equation system to the four-equation system shown in Eq. (18). Fur-
thermore, note that the r.h.s. of Eq. (18) is independent of jurisdictions’ type: this is a
consequence of the fact that the lobbying power, λi, and the relative size, ni, of groups
13
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a and b, are the same in both types of localities. This implies that tij on the l.h.s. is
independent of j, which in turn implies that ti1 = ti2 = t¯i. That is, type-1 and type-2
jurisdictions set the same tax rate on tax base i, and therefore the individual tax rates
(ti1, ti2) are equal to their average t¯i. Hence, each equilibrium tax rate t
∗
i on tax base i
is characterized by a single equation, as a function of the lobbying parameters and the
equalization rate, as follows:
t∗i
1− t∗i
=
γ − (1 + λi)/(1 + λ¯)
γ(1− θi)εi
, i = a, b. (19)
Recall that, in Section 3.4, we assumed γ > 1. In the absence of lobbying distortions,
γ > 1 ensures that, for θi ∈ [0, 1], the marginal (and average) tax rate t
∗
i , i = a, b,
defined in Eq. (19), is strictly positive but not greater than unity (it is t∗i = 1, i.e.,
100%, for θi = 1). Instead, under lobbying distortions the tax rate t
∗
b is negative (i.e., a
subsidy) if 1 < γ < (1+λb)/(1+ λ¯). Clearly, we prefer to rule out income subsidization,
since equalization of negative tax revenues redistributes in the wrong direction, from
poor to rich localities, as well as marginal tax rates above 100%. Hence, we introduce
the following restrictions, to ensure that t∗i ∈ [0, 1], i = a, b.
Assumption 3 θi ∈ [0, 1], i = a, b; γ − (1 + λb)/(1 + λ¯) ≥ 0.
Eqs. (19) highlight the factors driving tax choices. If lobbying is absent or ineffective
(i.e., λb = λa = λ¯ ≥ 0) and fiscal equalization is not present (i.e., θi = 0), then
local taxation is second-best efficient, since each tax rate ti is set by equating marginal
benefits and marginal costs of public expenditure. The latter are an increasing function
of the compensated elasticity, εi, of the tax base, which determines the excess burden
of taxation. Hence, the higher the marginal benefits, γ, and the lower the elasticity
of tax base i, εi, the higher the equilibrium tax rate t
∗
i . Fiscal equalization distorts
taxation upwards, since t∗i is increasing in θi, the equalization rate of tax base i. Finally,
if the special interest groups are heterogeneous in terms of lobbying power, that is,
λb > λ¯ > λa (recall Assumption 2), then taxation is distorted downward on group b
and upward on group a.
Assumption 3 represents also a sufficient condition for the concavity of the objective
function of local governments in the own tax rates. In fact, by differentiating the
derivative in Eq. (17), we get:
∂2Ωj
∂t2ij
= −γ(1 + λ¯)
[
1−
1 + λi
γ(1 + λ¯)
+
(1− tij + θit¯i) εi
1− tij
]
z¯ijεi
1− tij
, i = a, b. (20)
Assumption 3 is sufficient to ensure that the second order derivatives in Eq. (20) are
both negative. Moreover, the Hessian is positive, since ∂2Ωj/(∂ta∂tb) = 0. Hence, Ωj
is concave in the tax rates.
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We denote with t∗ = (t∗a, t
∗
b) the vector of the equilibrium tax rates defined by Eqs.
(19), and we append the subscript ‘∗’ to variables that depend on the equilibrium tax
rates. For instance, x∗ij = x˜ij(pij , t
∗
i ) denotes the equilibrium supply of type-i factor
in type-j localities, and T ∗j = Tj(t
∗) denotes the equilibrium tax revenues in type-j
localities.
4.2 Optimal equalization with lobbying at the local level
In this section, we examine the choice of the equalization rates by the central govern-
ment, assuming that the latter is fully benevolent. That is, when setting the equaliza-
tion program, the central policy maker accounts for the influence of the lobby groups on
local fiscal policies. However, taxpayers do not attempt to influence the policy choices
at the central level. We consider the implications of lobbying distortions at the central
level in Section 5.
By inserting the equilibrium tax rates into Eq. (14), per capita social welfare in a
type-j locality, as a function of the equalization rates, is equal to:6
W ∗j (θ) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
nk {vkj(t
∗
k) + γ [Tj(t
∗) + Ej(t
∗)]} , j = 1, 2. (21)
Recall that, by Assumption 1, type-2 localities are more productive than type-1.
This implies that, in the absence of central government intervention, the per capita
social welfare is higher in type-2 than that in type-1 localities. Fiscal equalization can
then be used to redistribute from rich to poor localities.
We assume that the central authority aims at maximizing a Utilitarian nonsym-
metric social welfare function of per capita local welfare levels:7
Ψ(θ) =W ∗1 (θ) + (1− ψ)W
∗
2 (θ), (22)
where ψ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter expressing the preferences for inter-regional redistribu-
tion. If ψ = 0, the social welfare function is Utilitarian symmetric, with equal weights
for type-1 and type-2 localities. If ψ = 1, the social welfare function is of maximin or
Rawlsian type, since the objective is to maximize per capita welfare of poor localities.
6Social welfare, as defined in Eq. (21), represents a linear aggregation, with uniform weights, of net
welfare of resident agents (gross welfare less political contributions paid to the local policy maker), and
policy maker’s welfare (political contributions). Representing a pure transfer from lobbyists to policy
makers, political contributions cancel out from the expression for social welfare.
7Although we have assumed that there are J > 1 identical localities of each type j, j = 1, 2, to
ease the notation, and without loss of generality, we compute national aggregates by considering one
locality of each type only.
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Note that in the Utilitarian symmetric case the social planner is concerned only
about efficiency. To see this, recall that (i) the marginal utility of private consumption
is constant and uniform for all types of agents in all localities, and (ii) the marginal
utility of local public expenditure is also constant and uniform in all localities. Then the
national social welfare function (22), for ψ = 0, shows no preference for redistribution,
both at the individual and at the local level; indeed, it is invariant to any kind of
balanced-budget lump sum transfers among individuals or localities. It is sensitive
only to the efficiency costs of tax distortions. For ψ > 0, instead, the social planner
cares for both efficiency and equity (maximal preference for equity if ψ = 1).
Note also that the objective function (22) is well-behaved for the problem at hand,
since fiscal equalization can never determine re-ranking between high and low produc-
tivity localities, in terms of per capita fiscal capacity, individual welfare and per capita
local welfare. We formalize this property of fiscal equalization in the following lemma,
which also establishes that full equalization of fiscal capacities cannot be optimal.
Lemma 1 Assume A.1 (type-2 localities are more productive than type-1) and A.3 (lo-
cal marginal tax rates are non-negative, and not greater than 100%, on both production
factors’ incomes). Then, θi = 1 cannot be optimal. For any equalization rate θi ∈ [0, 1),
the per capita tax base on production factor i, the welfare of type-i agents, and the per
capita local social welfare, are strictly higher in type-2 than in type-1 localities. That
is: z¯∗i1 < z¯
∗
i2, w
∗
i1 < w
∗
i2, i = a, b; W
∗
1
< W ∗
2
.
Proof. Under A.1 and A.3, with no equalization (θi = 0), by Eqs. (19), the
equilibrium marginal tax rates are positive and below 100%; hence, factors supplies,
incomes, and social welfare, are positive in both types of localities. With full equaliza-
tion (θi = 1), the marginal tax rates are equal to 100%; hence, factors supplies, incomes,
and social welfare, are nil in both types of localities. This shows that θi = 1 cannot be
optimal. As for the second part of the lemma, recall that type-1 and type-2 localities
set identical and positive tax rates t∗i . Hence, by Assumption 1, (1−t
∗
i )pi1 < (1−t
∗
i )pi2.
Since factors’ supplies are upward sloping, the latter inequality implies pi1x
∗
i1 < pi2x
∗
i2,
v∗i1 < v
∗
i2. Moreover, z¯
∗
i1 < z¯
∗
i2, since type-a and type-b agents are in the same pro-
portion in both types of localities. For θi < 1, i = a, b, per capita public expenditure,
T ∗j +E
∗
j , is higher in type-2 than in type-1 localities, since tax revenues are higher while
the equalization mechanism does not fully equalize total resources. Higher welfare from
private consumption (v∗i1 < v
∗
i2) and higher benefits from public goods imply that all
agents of a given type resident in type-2 localities are better off than those of the same
type resident in type-1 localities. That is, w∗i1 < w
∗
i2. This also implies that the per
capita social welfare is higher in type-2 than in type-1 localities.
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To compute the impact on a type-j locality’s social welfare of an increase in fiscal
equalization, we differentiate Eq. (21) with respect to θi, obtaining:
∂W ∗j
∂θi
= −nipijx
∗
ij
∂t∗i
∂θi
+ γ
(
∂T ∗j
∂θi
+
∂E∗j
∂θi
)
. (23)
Recall that t∗ij = t
∗
i = t¯
∗
i , j = 1, 2. Hence, in equilibrium, tax revenues and
equalization grants are equal to:
T ∗j (t
∗) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
t∗kz¯
∗
kj , E
∗
j (t
∗) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
θkt
∗
k
(
z¯∗k − z¯
∗
kj
)
,
respectively, with derivatives:
∂T ∗j
∂θi
= z¯∗ij
(
1−
t∗i εi
1− t∗i
)
∂t∗i
∂θi
, (24)
∂E∗j
∂θi
= t∗i
(
z¯∗i − z¯
∗
ij
)
+ θi
(
z¯∗i − z¯
∗
ij
)(
1−
t∗i εi
1− t∗i
)
∂t∗i
∂θi
. (25)
We use Eqs. (24)-(25) and the fact that, by Eq. (19),
t∗i εi
1− t∗i
=
γ − Λi
γ (1− θi)
, Λi =
1 + λi
1 + λ¯
,
to manipulate Eq. (23). This allows us to obtain the following expression for the
impact of an increase in the equalization rate θi on social welfare (22) as:
∂Ψ
∂θi
= ψγ (z¯∗i − z¯
∗
i1) t
∗
i +
ψθi (Λi − γθi)
1− θi
(z¯∗i − z¯
∗
i1)
∂t∗i
∂θi
+
+
(
Λi − 1− (γ − 1)θi
1− θi
)
[z¯∗i1 + (1− ψ)z¯
∗
i2]
∂t∗i
∂θi
. (26)
The derivative in Eq. (26) highlights the key factors driving the design of the
fiscal equalization system, by showing that an increase in the equalization rate of tax
base i impacts on social welfare through three channels, two of which bear on equity,
one on efficiency. The first term in the derivative is a mechanical equity term, since it
accounts for the marginal transfer of resources from rich to poor localities of a marginal
increase in fiscal equalization, for given levels of local tax revenues. The second term
is a behavioral equity term, since it accounts for the impact of a marginal change in
the degree of fiscal equalization on local tax revenues. If taxation is on the increasing
side of the Laffer curve (a condition that can be seen to hold if Λi > γθi), then an
increase in θi, by increasing the equilibrium tax rate t
∗
i , increases tax revenues in both
types of localities and also the amount of transfers from rich to poor localities. Under
Assumption 1, it is z¯∗i > z¯
∗
i1, hence both equity terms are positive, provided that the
social planner has some preference for redistribution, i.e., ψ > 0. Finally, the third
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Model pa1 pa2 pb1 pb2 εa εb θ
∗
a
θ∗
b
t∗
a
t∗
b
W ∗
1
W ∗
2
W ∗
I.0 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.25 0.4 0.4 — — .37 .37 1.407 1.556 2.962
.51 .51 .54 .54 1.422 1.516 2.938
II.0 1.00 1.30 1.00 1.22 0.2 0.6 — — .54 .28 1.464 1.634 3.098
.59 .48 .74 .43 1.486 1.581 3.067
III.0 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.50 0.4 0.4 — — .37 .37 1.407 1.636 3.043
.51 .65 .54 .63 1.439 1.560 2.999
Other parameters: λa = λb = 0, ψ = 1, na = nb = .5, γ = 1.3.
Table 1: Optimal equalization in the absence of lobbying.
term in Eq. (26) accounts for the impact of a marginal increase in the equalization
rates on efficiency. If local taxation is not distorted by lobbying, i.e., if Λi = 1, then
the term is nil for θi = 0 and negative for θi > 0; the reason is that fiscal equalization,
by distorting taxation upwards, is detrimental for efficiency. If, instead, taxation is
distorted by lobbying, then Λb > 1 and Λa < 1: since the tax rate t
∗
b is distorted
downward whereas t∗a is distorted upward, efficiency calls in principle for a positive
equalization rate on tax base b and negative one on tax base a.
Assuming that the second order conditions hold, and that the solution is unique,
the optimal equalization parameters, θ∗i , i = a, b, are obtained by solving the respective
first order conditions, ∂Ψ/∂θi = 0, obtained from Eq. (26). In order to gain insights
about the factors affecting the structure of the optimal equalization scheme, and with
a purely illustrative purpose, we resort to some numerical simulations.8
We start by considering, in Table 1, optimal equalization in the absence of lobbying
distortions, assuming that the central planner maximizes a Rawlsian social welfare
function (i.e., ψ = 1). The table reports, for three model specifications, first the
laissez faire situation and then that under optimal equalization. In model specification
I.0 there is perfect symmetry between production factors a and b: equal tax base
elasticities (εa = εb) and equal inter-regional productivity ratios (pa2/pa1 = pb2/pb1).
Hence, the optimal equalization rate is the same, θ∗i = .51, on both tax bases. Fiscal
equalization increases social welfare in type-1 localities (W ∗
1
, that corresponds to social
welfare Ψ, for ψ = 1), reduces it in type-2 jurisdictions (W ∗
2
), and since it distorts local
tax rates upward from 37 to 54%, it reduces aggregate welfare (W ∗ =W ∗
1
+W ∗
2
). That
is, fiscal equalization strikes a balance between benefits and costs of inter-regional
8The specification of the utility function (1) is φi = 1−5 [εi(1 + εi)]x
(1+εi)/εi
ij , that gives the supply
function x˜ij =
1
5
[(1− tij)pij ]
εi . Second order conditions for a maximum are satisfied in all numerical
computations, and the solution is always unique.
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redistribution. With heterogeneous tax base elasticities,9 model II.0 shows that the
optimal equalization rate is higher on the less elastic tax base than on the more elastic
one (εa < εb, θ
∗
a > θ
∗
b ). The obvious reason is that the distortion caused by fiscal
equalization on tax setting is lower on an inelastic than on an elastic tax base. Finally,
with identical tax base elasticities and heterogeneous productivity ratios, model III.0
shows that the optimal equalization rate is higher on the tax base characterized by
the higher inter-regional productivity ratio than on the one characterized by the lower
ratio (pa2/pa1 < pb2/pb1, θ
∗
a < θ
∗
b ). The reason is that the benefits from inter-regional
redistribution are larger where fiscal capacity gaps are larger in relative terms.
The results in Table 1, that we summarize below in Proposition 1, parts (ii) and (iii),
recover, in the context of inter-regional equalization transfers, some classical findings of
optimal tax theory. To see this, note that the equalization program defined in Eq. (9)
amounts to employing a pair of linear income taxes, one for each production factor k,
to redistribute from rich to poor jurisdictions. For type-j localities, their standard tax
revenues, t¯kz¯kj , represent taxable income. The equalization rate, θk, is the (constant)
marginal tax rate, while the average standard tax revenues, t¯kz¯k, determine, under the
balanced budget constraint, a lump sum transfer to all localities, θk t¯kz¯k, akin to the
demogrant of a linear income tax. The higher the equalization rate θk, the higher the
degree of progressivity of the inter-regional transfer mechanism. Optimal redistribution
strikes a balance between its costs in terms of efficiency, which are a direct function
of the (compensated) elasticity of the equalized tax bases, and its benefits in terms
of equity, which are a direct function of the gap in fiscal capacities between rich and
poor localities.10 The rate differentiation result that emerges from model II.0 in Table
1 recovers also the well-known Ramsey inverse elasticity rule of optimal commodity
tax theory, by which efficiency calls for tax rates that are inversely related to tax base
elasticity.
We now introduce local lobbying into the picture. If groups a and b are equally
powerful in lobbying (i.e., λb = λa > 0), then model I.0 in Table 2 shows that lobbying
is irrelevant. The pressure groups simply offset each other in the attempt to lean tax
policy to their advantage, and the outcome is identical to that in Table 1 in the absence
of lobbying. Lobbying affects local tax setting and the optimality conditions for fiscal
9For given productivity parameters (pk1, pk2), the relative fiscal capacity gap on tax base k, (z¯k2 −
z¯k1)/z¯k, is an increasing function of its elasticity εk. Hence, in order to isolate the role of the tax base
elasticity in the determination of the optimal equalization rate, in model II.0 the parameters (pk1, pk2)
are adjusted such that, for both εa = .2 and εb = .6, the relative fiscal capacity gap is the same as in
the benchmark model I.0, where εa = εb = .4.
10The optimal degree of progressivity of the program is also higher the more pronounced are the
preferences of the central policy maker for redistribution, here expressed by the parameter ψ.
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Model λa λb θ
∗
a
θ∗
b
t∗
a
t∗
b
W ∗
1
W ∗
2
W ∗
I.0 0.2 0.2 — — .37 .37 1.407 1.556 2.962
.51 .51 .54 .54 1.422 1.516 2.938
I.1 0.2 0.4 — — .42 .30 1.405 1.554 2.959
.43 .61 .56 .52 1.422 1.516 2.938
I.2 0.2 0.6 — — .46 .23 1.403 1.551 2.953
.36 .71 .57 .51 1.423 1.515 2.938
I.3 0.2 1.0 — — .51 .09 1.394 1.538 2.932
.27 .90 .59 .48 1.424 1.513 2.937
Other parameters: pa1 = pb1 = 1.00, pa2 = pb2 = 1.25,
εa = εb = 0.4, ψ = 1, na = nb = .5, γ = 1.3.
Table 2: Optimal equalization with lobbying at the local level.
equalization only if the pressure groups are heterogeneous in terms of lobbying power.
With group b more powerful than a, Table 2 shows that local taxation is distorted
downward on the former group and upward on the latter. Hence, equalization of tax
base b is good for both equity and efficiency, since it transfers resources from rich
to poor localities and it provides incentives to local governments to raise taxation on
the more powerful lobby group. On the contrary, equalization of tax base a is good
for equity but is really bad for efficiency, since it gives further incentives to tax an
already overtaxed group. Hence, ceteris paribus, optimal equalization under lobbying
distortions calls for differentiated equalization rates: a high equalization rate on the
tax base backed by the strong lobby group, a low one on that backed by the weak
lobby group. As group b becomes relatively more powerful than group a, models I.1,
I.2 and I.3 of Table 2 show that the equalization rate increases on tax base b from
51% to 90%, while it decreases on tax base a from 51% to 27%.11 Note also that,
when lobbying distortions are important, like in model I.3, fiscal equalization can do
good both for equity, by increasing welfare in the poor localities, and for efficiency, by
increasing aggregate welfare at the national level.
The results illustrated above are summarized in the following proposition, which is
thus given without proof.
11It can be optimal not to equalize tax base a. The corner solution θ∗a = 0 occurs if, for a given
productivity gap pa2/pa1 > 1, the lobby power gap λb/λa > 1 is above a given threshold; or, conversely,
if, for a given lobby power gap, the productivity gap is below a given threshold. In this situation, it is
optimal to equalize at a positive rate the actual, rather than the standard, tax revenues, of tax base a.
On this point, see the working paper version of the present work (Esteller-More´ et al., 2015).
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Proposition 1 If there is lobbying at the local level, while the central planner chooses
the equalization rates to maximize social welfare, then, ceteris paribus, the optimal
equalization rate is higher (i) on the tax base backed by the more powerful lobby group,
(ii) on the less elastic tax base, (iii) on the tax base characterized by a relatively higher
inter-regional fiscal-capacity gap.
5 Fiscal equalization with lobbying at the central level
We now shift from a normative to a positive perspective by allowing for lobbying
also at the central level of government. In particular, we assume that taxpayers act
sequentially: in a first stage, they lobby the central policy maker on the choice of the
fiscal equalization rates; in a second stage, they lobby their local policy maker on the
choice of the tax rates, given the equalization rates set in the first stage. At both
stages, the lobby groups offer truthful contribution functions of the type defined in
Section 3.5.
As for the second stage, we have already derived, in Section 4.1, Eq. (19), the
equilibrium local tax rates, t∗i (θi), i = a, b. As for the first stage, we define the truthful
contribution function offered by lobby group i resident in a type-j locality by substi-
tuting t∗i (θi) into Eq. (15), which gives:
12
Q∗ij(θ) = λiniwij(t
∗). (27)
By summing over groups i and localities j, in the aggregate the contributions pre-
sented by lobbyists to the central policy maker, as a function of the equalization rates,
are equal to:
Q∗(θ) =
2∑
j=1
∑
i∈{a,b}
Q∗ij(θ) =
2∑
j=1
Q∗j(θ). (28)
Note that each local group independently lobbies the central policy maker. In
fact, production factors of the same type i but resident in different types of localities
have different views about the preferred structure of the fiscal equalization program.
Typically, individuals resident in a rich locality lobby for lower equalization, since
equalization means higher tax burdens, part of which are transferred to poor localities.
Individuals resident in a poor locality, instead, may favor higher equalization, if the
inflow of equalization transfers more than compensates for the increase in local tax
rates.
12To derive the policy choices under the influence of lobbying, we ignore, as explained in footnote 5,
the non-negativity constraint on political contributions.
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The central policy maker cares both for national welfare, as expressed by the social
welfare function defined in Eq. (22), and for political contributions by the lobby groups,
defined in Eq. (28), with equal weights for the two components. That is, the objective
function of the central policy maker is:
Ω(θ) = Ψ(θ) +Q∗(θ). (29)
The first term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (29) is the objective function of the benevolent
social planner examined in Section 4.2. The first order condition for maximizing Ψ(θ)
is based on the partial derivative shown in Eq. (26). Hence, in order to asses the
implications of lobbying at the central level, all we need to do is to characterize the
incentives provided by the contribution functions Q∗(θ) appearing in Eq. (29).
5.1 Differentiated equalization rates
By differentiating Q∗j(θ), defined in Eq. (28), with respect to θi, we get:
∂Q∗j
∂θi
= −λiz¯
∗
kj
∂t∗i
∂θi
+ λ¯γ
(
∂T ∗j
∂θi
+
∂E∗j
∂θi
)
.
Using Eq. (12), the above derivative can be written as:
∂Q∗j
∂θi
=
(
z¯∗i − z¯
∗
ij
)
λ¯
[
γt∗i +
θi (Λi − γθi)
1− θi
∂t∗i
∂θi
]
+ z¯∗ij
(
λ¯
Λi − γθi
1− θi
− λi
)
∂t∗i
∂θi
.
By aggregating over j, the first term cancels out, while, after some manipulations, the
second term can be written as:
2∑
j=1
∂Q∗j
∂θi
= 2z¯∗i
(
λ¯− λi(
1 + λ¯
)
(1− θi)
−
λ¯
(
γ − λi/λ¯
)
θi
1− θi
)
∂t∗i
∂θi
. (30)
The derivative (30) of the contribution functions shows that the distortions caused
by lobbying at the central level on the determination of the equalization rates can be
decomposed into two terms. The first one depends on the relative lobbying power of
the two groups. By Assumption 2, it is negative for group b and positive for a; that is,
the more powerful group b induces the central policy maker to lower equalization, and
therefore taxation, on its income, at the expense of the less powerful group a, whose
equalization rate, and hence taxation, increases. The second term calls instead for lower
equalization rates on both tax bases, since, by Assumption 3, it is negative for i = a, b.
Lobbying at the central level, by distorting the preferences of the central policy maker
in favor of a more efficient equalization policy, reduces inter-regional redistribution.
Note also that the efficiency term is, in absolute value, greater for tax base a than for
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Model λa λb Lobbying θ
∗
a
θ∗
b
t∗
a
t∗
b
W ∗
1
W ∗
2
W ∗
I.0 0.2 0.2 only local .51 .51 .54 .54 1.422 1.516 2.938
local and central .43 .43 .50 .50 1.421 1.527 2.948
I.1 0.2 0.4 only local .43 .61 .56 .52 1.422 1.516 2.938
local and central .42 .36 .55 .40 1.418 1.529 2.948
I.2 0.2 0.6 only local .36 .71 .57 .51 1.423 1.515 2.938
local and central .40 .26 .59 .29 1.412 1.529 2.941
I.3 0.2 1.0 only local .27 .90 .59 .48 1.424 1.513 2.937
local and central .37 .00 .63 .09 1.395 1.517 2.912
Other parameters: pa1 = pb1 = 1.00, pa2 = pb2 = 1.25,
εa = εb = 0.4, ψ = 1, na = nb = .5, γ = 1.3.
Table 3: Equalization with lobbying at the local and central level.
tax base b, since taxation on the former group is distorted upward by lobbying at the
local level, whereas that on the latter group is distorted downward.
The numerical simulations reported in Table 3 confirm the intuitions developed
above. With equally powerful lobby groups (model I.0), lobbying at the central level
reduces the equalization rates from 51% (the optimal values, given the Rawlsian ob-
jective) to 43%. Hence, while two equally powerful lobby groups do not succeed in
distorting policy choices at the local level, they do succeed at the central level. The
reason is the one noted above: with equally powerful groups, the truthful contribution
functions (28) offered at the central level by the lobby groups amount to a symmet-
ric Utilitarian social welfare function, which provides incentives for a more efficiency-
oriented equalization policy (indeed, in the absence of lobbying, the maximization of a
symmetric social welfare function implies no equalization). Model I.1 in Table 3 shows
that lobbying at the central level reduces both equalization rates, with respect to their
optimal values, also when the lobby groups are similar in terms of lobbying power,
with an impact that is more pronounced for the more powerful group. If, instead, the
groups are highly heterogeneous in terms of lobbying power, then the central policy
maker is led to deviate substantially from the optimal policy. As shown by models I.2
and I.3, equalization is lowered on the tax base backed by the more powerful group b,
and increased on that backed by the less powerful group a. In terms of Eq. (30), it
means that for group a the (positive) lobby power term exceeds the (negative) lobby
efficiency term.
We summarize the above results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If taxpayers lobby at both levels of government, both equalization rates
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are distorted downward if the lobby groups are equal, or similar, in terms of lobbying
power. If, instead, the groups are highly heterogeneous in terms of lobbying power, then
the equalization rate on the tax base backed by the more powerful group is distorted
downward, while that on the tax base backed by less powerful group is distorted upward.
5.2 Differentiated versus uniform equalization rates
The normative analysis conducted in Section 4.2 has shown that the optimal rates of
fiscal equalization are contingent on the elasticities of the local tax bases subjected to
equalization, on the differences in local fiscal capacities, and on the distortions induced
by taxpayers’ lobbying on local policies. This implies that, in general, the optimal
structure of the equalization rates on the various fiscal capacities measures is a differ-
entiated one. However, as we have described in Section 2, in practice what is observed
is a pattern of uniform equalization rates. This is apparently a sub-optimal arrange-
ment, since the typical tax bases subjected to equalization are highly heterogeneous
in terms of tax rate elasticity, geographical dispersion, political activism of affected
taxpayers. However, our theoretical analysis offers also a justification for uniformity of
equalization rates, which is prompted by the positive analysis of the impact of lobbying
at the central level. The argument is simple. If the choice of the equalization rates at
the central level are highly distorted by the pressure of special interest groups, then
uniform equalization can perform better than a differentiated one.13
Table 4 illustrates with reference to type 2 and type 3 numerical simulations, in
which the lobby groups are highly heterogeneous in terms of lobbying power. In models
I.2 and I.3, in which the optimal structure of fiscal equalization is uniform at 51% (see
model I.0 in Table 1), if rate differentiation is allowed, then lobbying at the central
level causes an ample differentiation in favor of the more powerful group (40% and
26% in model I.2; 37% and 0% in model I.3). By setting uniform equalization rates
(37% in model I.2, 34% in model I.3), the outcome still falls short of the optimal one.
However, social welfare in type-1 poor localities is higher under uniform than under
differentiated equalization.
Uniform equalization performs better than differential equalization also in type II
model, in which the optimal structure of equalization is a differential one, since tax base
a is less elastic than b. In this case, the benefits of uniformity, that counteract lobbying
distortions at the central level, exceed the costs of imposing uniform equalization on
tax bases with different elasticities. Clearly, also the opposite outcome is possible, if we
13We do not model how uniformity of the equalization rates can be imposed; if, for instance, by a
legal provision or by a superior constitutional rule. We simply consider the impact of the restriction
on social welfare.
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Model λa λb Equalization θ
∗
a
θ∗
b
t∗
a
t∗
b
W ∗
1
W ∗
2
W ∗
I.2 0.2 0.6 differential .40 .26 .59 .29 1.412 1.529 2.941
uniform .37 .37 .57 .32 1.415 1.530 2.945
I.3 0.2 1.0 differential .37 .00 .63 .09 1.395 1.517 2.912
uniform .34 .34 .62 .13 1.400 1.520 2.920
II.2 0.2 0.6 differential .47 .21 .76 .20 1.475 1.590 3.065
uniform .44 .44 .75 .26 1.478 1.592 3.070
II.3 0.2 1.0 differential .43 .00 .79 .06 1.463 1.582 3.044
uniform .42 .42 .78 .10 1.466 1.584 3.050
III.2 0.2 0.6 differential .40 .50 .59 .38 1.429 1.594 3.023
uniform .44 .44 .60 .35 1.425 1.595 3.020
III.3 0.2 1.0 differential .37 .40 .63 .14 1.405 1.592 2.998
uniform .37 .37 .63 .13 1.404 1.593 2.996
Parameters pa1, pa2, pb1, pb2, εa, εb, as in Models I, II, III, Table 1.
Other parameters: ψ = 1, na = nb = .5, γ = 1.3.
Table 4: Lobbying at the central level: the benefits of uniform equalization.
consider higher heterogeneity in tax base elasticities. In type III model, in which rate
differentiation is motivated by heterogeneity in tax base differentials between type-1
and type-2 localities, uniform equalization is worse than differentiated equalization.
However, it is sufficient to decrease the productivity gaps between poor and rich ju-
risdictions to find examples in which uniform equalization is superior to differentiated
equalization.
We generalize the results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If taxpayers lobby at both levels of government, and if the lobby groups
are sufficiently heterogeneous in terms of lobbying power, then uniform equalization
performs better, in terms of social welfare, than differentiated equalization.
The comparison between uniform and non-uniform policies in the presence of lobbying
distortions is also examined by Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) with reference to tariffs
policy. In their model, the advantage of a uniform tariff over a set of differentiated tariffs
is that of moderating lobbying activity. With differentiated tariffs, each pressure group
internalizes the private benefits (in terms of a lower tariff on its specific importable
production input) and the private costs (in terms of effort to influence the policy
maker) of lobbying activity. Instead, with a uniform tariff the benefits are public,
giving rise to free riding behavior that reduces aggregate lobbying effort. In our setup,
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a different mechanism is at work, since free riding among lobby groups is not an issue
in common agency models of lobbying. Namely, lobbying distorts the preferences of the
central policy maker in favor of the more capable pressure group, with the result that
one equalization rate is pushed above, while the other one is pushed below, its optimal
level; hence, a uniform equalization rate, albeit sub-optimal, may perform better than
differentiated equalization.
We finally note that lobbying is not the only source of policy distortion that, in the
present context, can point in favor of a uniform policy.14 One of such factors is imperfect
knowledge, on the part of the central government, of the economic environment at the
local level. To illustrate, suppose that the central authority determines the equalization
rates using biased estimates of local tax base elasticities (similar results come forth
if the central planner uses biased measures of local fiscal capacities). Then, a case
in favor of uniformity emerges if the elasticity of the more elastic tax base is over-
estimated while that of the less elastic tax base is under-estimated, since this causes
the equalization rate on the more (less) elastic tax base to be below (above) its optimal
level. Clearly, the case for uniformity is weak or absent if both elasticities are over-
or under-estimated, or if the elasticity of the more elastic tax base is under-estimated
while that of the less elastic tax base is over-estimated. Policy distortions can also ensue
from the central government favoring politically aligned local jurisdictions. However,
in this case uniform equalization is unlikely to outperform differentiated equalization.
To see this, suppose that the fraction of ‘rich’ jurisdictions that are politically aligned
with the central government is greater than that of ‘poor’ jurisdictions, so that the
preferences of the central government are biased against egalitarian policies. Because
of this bias, both equalization rates are pushed below their optimal levels, which implies
that imposing uniformity is unlikely to bring some benefits over differentiation. The
result is similar if the central government has a bias in favor of poor localities, since
both equalization rates are set above their optimal levels. Contrary to lobbying, that
by distorting the equalization rates in opposite directions makes uniformity attractive,
regional favoritism on the part of the central government, by distorting the equalization
rates in the same direction, makes uniformity useless.
6 Vertical equalization
The analysis in the previous sections is framed in the context of an equalization sys-
tem of horizontal type, in which transfers to poor jurisdictions are financed by rich
14We thank one referee for urging us to consider these issues. The results, obtained by means of
numerical simulations, are available upon request.
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jurisdictions of the same layer of government. As illustrated in Section 2, the prac-
tice of equalization transfers also employs mechanisms of vertical type, in which it is
a higher government layer (usually, the central government) that finances the redis-
tributive program. In this section, we briefly consider vertical equalization, leaving all
technical details to an online Appendix.
For the sake of concreteness, we adapt our theoretical framework to fit the Canadian
Representative Tax System (RTS) described in Section 2, which is characterized by the
fact that transfers are paid only to provinces with below-average fiscal capacity, with
financing by the federal government. Thus, we let only the type-1 poor localities qualify
for the transfer, and let the transfers be financed by tax resources at the central level.
As for the latter, we do not explicitly model a tax base for the central government, but
we simply assume that tax revenues raised at the central level imply an excess burden
that, at the margin, is constant and exogenously given.
Horizontal and vertical equalization bear different implications for local tax set-
ting. While under the horizontal scheme examined in the previous sections both types
of jurisdictions set the same tax rate on the same type of tax base, under vertical equal-
ization type-1 localities set tax rates that are higher than those of type-2 localities, for
the simple reason that for the former tax setting is distorted upward by the incentives
of equalization, whereas for the latter there are no distortions, as they do not directly
participate to fiscal equalization; they participate only indirectly, by contributing to
the central tax revenues that finance the program. In formal terms, the tax-setting
condition for type-1 localities is Eq. (18) with θi ≥ 0; for type-2 localities it is Eq. (18)
with θi = 0. Hence, for θi > 0, it is t
∗
i1 > t¯
∗
i > t
∗
i2, where t¯
∗
i is the average or standard
tax rate defined in Eq. (10). Only t∗i1 and t¯
∗
i are an increasing function of θi.
With lobbying only at the local level, the central planner maximizes the social
welfare function (22), with local welfare levels that are now defined as:
W ∗1 (θ) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
nk {vk1(t
∗
k1) + γ [T1(t
∗
1) + E1(t
∗)]} − ξδ1E1(t
∗), (31)
W ∗2 (θ) =
∑
k∈{a,b}
nk {vk2(t
∗
k2) + γT2(t
∗
2)} − ξδ2E1(t
∗), (32)
where t∗j is the vector of the equilibrium tax rates in a type-j locality, t
∗ = (t∗
1
, t∗
2
). The
equalization payment is given only to type-1 jurisdictions, but both types of localities
participate to its financing through central taxation. The parameter ξ > 1 represents
the marginal cost of public funds, which is greater than unity because we assume that
central taxes are distortionary. The parameters δj , j = 1, 2, δ1 + δ2 = 1, represent the
share of central tax revenues collected in a type-j locality. In this respect, it is natural
27
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to extend Assumption 1 by assuming that δ1 < δ2: type-2 rich localities contribute
more than type-1 poor localities.
The formal derivation of the first order conditions that define the optimal struc-
ture of the vertical equalization rates with lobbying at the local level is in the online
Appendix, which also includes numerical simulations. Here we recap the main findings.
The optimal equalization rates are generally higher under vertical than under hor-
izontal equalization, since, as noted above, vertical equalization is less distortionary
than horizontal equalization on local tax setting. As with horizontal equalization, the
equalization rates should be adjusted to counteract the distortions caused by lobbying
on local tax setting, since it is good for efficiency to use the incentive effects of fiscal
equalization to raise taxation on the strong lobby group and to decrease it on the weak
one.
With lobbying at both levels of government, under vertical equalization there are
no distortions of the equalization rates due to heterogeneity in lobbying power by the
two groups (in contrast, with horizontal equalization, heterogeneity matters also for
lobbying at the central level). Only the average power of the lobby groups matters.
That is, lobbying at the central level distorts the choices of the central policy maker
towards a less egalitarian, hence more efficiency oriented, equalization policy.
7 Concluding remarks
We have examined the functioning of tax-base equalization transfers in a setting in
which taxpayers try to influence policy making both at the local and at the central
level of government. Our theoretical analysis helps to assess the practice, adopted by
all countries implementing fiscal equalization, of using uniform equalization rates on the
various fiscal capacity measures subjected to equalization. If the pressure groups play a
negligible role in local tax setting and in redistributive policy, then uniform equalization
is in general suboptimal, since it is helpful to differentiate the equalization rates in
relation to tax base elasticities and to the degree of their geographical dispersion.
If, instead, the lobby groups play an important role, thus severely distorting fiscal
equalization, then uniformity of the equalization rates is a better arrangement in terms
of social welfare.
In future work, the scope of the analysis can be extended in various directions.
First, we can remove the hypothesis of perfect substitutability between production
factors. With imperfect substitutability, taxation would bear general equilibrium effects
on the before-tax market returns of production factors, thus determining tax shifting
between sectors. Second, fiscal equalization can be generalized to include not only
28
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
fiscal capacities but also expenditure needs. Finally, we can consider lobbying by local
authorities on the central government to obtain more generous transfers.
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Online Appendix to the article
Fiscal Equalization and Lobbying
Alejandro Esteller-Moré, Umberto Galmarini, Leonzio Rizzo
June 10, 2016
Section A contains the analytics and the numerical simulations of the vertical equaliza-
tion scheme considered in Section 6 of the article. Section B extends the analysis of the
horizontal equalization program considered in Sections 3-5 of the article by introducing
mobility of production factors across local jurisdictions.
A. Vertical equalization
Under the equalization scheme described in Section 6 of the article, the transfer to a
type-1 jurisdiction is equal to:
E1(t) =
X
k2fa;bg
ktk (zk   zk1) ,
where tk is the average tax rate dened in Eq. (10). The transfer is zero for type-2
jurisdictions.
Gross of the cost of central taxes levied to nance the equalization program, indi-
vidual welfare levels for type-i agents in type-1 and type-2 localities are equal to:
wi1(t1) = vi1(ti1) +  [T1(t1) + E1(t)] , (A.1)
wi2(t2) = vi2(ti2) + T2(t2). (A.2)
Under the inuence of lobbying, the objective function of the policy maker of a
type-j locality is (the local policy maker ignores, and takes as given, centrally raised
taxes; hence the latter do not appear in her objective function):

j(tj) =
X
k2fa;bg
nk(1 + k)wkj(tj). (A.3)
By maximizing the objective function (A.3) for j = 1; 2, we obtain the conditions
dening the equilibrium tax rates as:
ti2
1  ti2
=
   (1 + i)=(1 + )
"i
, i = a; b,
ti1   iti
1  ti1
=
   (1 + i)=(1 + )
"i
, i = a; b,
1
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where, as described in the article, it is:
ti1  ti2,
@ti1
@i
>
@ti
@i
>
@ti2
@i
= 0.
A.1 Lobbying only at the local level
As a function of the equalization rates, per capita social welfare in type-1 and type-2
jurisdictions is dened in Eqs. (31)-(32) of the article. The derivatives with respect to
i are equal to:
@W 1
@i
=  zi1
@ti1
@i
+ 
@T 1
@i
+ (   1)@E

1
@i
,
@W 2
@i
=  2@E

1
@i
.
Given that:
T j (t

j ) =
X
k2fa;bg
tkjz

kj , E

1(t

1) =
X
k2fa;bg
kt

k (z

k   zk1) ,
it is:
@T 1
@i
=

zi1 + t

i1
@zi1
@ti1

@ti1
@i
= zi1

1  t

i1"i
1  ti1

@ti1
@i
,
@T 2
@i
= 0,
@E1
@i
= ti (z

i   zi1) + i (zi   zi1)
@ti
@ti1
@ti1
@i
+
zi1
2
it

i "i
1  ti1
@ti1
@i
.
Using the latter derivatives to compute the derivative of the social welfare function,
	 =W 1 + (1   )W 2 :
@	
@i
=
@W 1
@i
+ (1   )@W

2
@i
,
after some manipulations we obtain the following derivative, which is the equivalent,
for vertical equalization, of derivative (26) in the article for horizontal equalization:
@	
@i
= (    +  2) (zi   zi1)

ti + i
@ti
@ti1
@ti1
@i

+
+
i   
1 + 
zi1
@ti1
@i
  ( + (1   2)) z

i1
2
it

i "i
1  ti1
@ti1
@i
. (A.4)
The rst term of the derivative refers to equity, i.e., to the transfer of central tax
revenues to type-1 localities. If the central planner is concerned only about e¢ ciency,
and thus assigns equal weight to type-1 and type-2 jurisdictions in the social welfare
function (i.e.,  = 0), then the equalization program nanced by central taxation is
2
Model pa1 pa2 pb1 pb2 "a "b 

a 

b t

a1 t

a2 t

b1 t

b2 W

1 W

2 W

I.0 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.25 0.4 0.4   .37 .37 .37 .37 1.407 1.556 2.962
.55 .55 .51 .37 .51 .37 1.411 1.532 2.944
II.0 1.00 1.30 1.00 1.22 0.2 0.6   .54 .54 .28 .28 1.464 1.634 3.098
.61 .52 .71 .54 .40 .28 1.471 1.602 3.073
III.0 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.50 0.4 0.4   .37 .37 .37 .37 1.407 1.636 3.043
.55 .90 .51 .37 .62 .37 1.418 1.583 3.001
Other parameters: a = b = 0,  = 1, na = nb = :5,  = 1:3,  = 1:8, 1 = 0:45, 2 = 0:55.
Table A.1: Optimal vertical equalization in the absence of lobbying.
justied only if  > ; that is, if the marginal benets of local public expenditure exceed
the social costs of the vertical transfer. If, instead, the social planner has some concern
for equity (i.e., if  > 0), then transfers can be justied even if  < . The second
term in Eq. (A.4) shows how the equalization rates should be adjusted to counteract
the distortions caused by lobbying. This term is positive for the strong lobby group b
(since b > ) and negative for the weak group a (since a < ): as with horizontal
equalization, it is good for e¢ ciency to use the incentive e¤ects of scal equalization to
raise taxation on the strong lobby group and to decrease it on the weak one. The third
term of the derivative refers to the total marginal cost of public funds of the resources
used to nance the transfers (the higher the costs, the lower the equalization rate at
the optimum).
For the same model specications used in the article, Table A.1 shows optimal
equalization of vertical type in the absence of lobbying. Note that the optimal equal-
ization rates are generally higher under vertical than under horizontal equalization. The
reason is that vertical equalization is less distortionary than horizontal equalization on
local tax setting, since with the former only the recipient localities are induced to raise
upwards their tax rates, while with the latter also the donor localities are distorted.
The comparison of Table A.2 with Table 2 in the article shows instead that lobbying
at the local level impacts in a similar way on the optimal structure of the two types
of equalization schemes. As groups a and b become more heterogeneous in terms of
lobbying power, the optimal equalization rate increases for the tax base backed by the
more powerful group b and it lowers for that backed by the less powerful group a.
A.2 Lobbying also at the central level
When taxpayers lobby also the central policy maker on the equalization rates, the
truthful contribution function of type-i agents resident in a type-j locality is dened
3
Model a b 

a 

b t

a1 t

a2 t

b1 t

b2 W

1 W

2 W

I.0 0.2 0.2   .37 .37 .37 .37 1.407 1.556 2.962
.55 .55 .51 .37 .51 .37 1.411 1.532 2.944
I.1 0.2 0.4   .42 .42 .30 .30 1.405 1.554 2.959
.29 .83 .50 .42 .52 .30 1.412 1.530 2.942
I.2 0.2 0.6   .46 .46 .23 .23 1.403 1.551 2.953
.09 1.00 .48 .46 .48 .23 1.413 1.529 2.942
I.3 0.2 1.0   .51 .51 .09 .09 1.394 1.538 2.932
.00 1.00 .51 .51 .21 .08 1.404 1.530 2.934
Other parameters: pa1 = pb1 = 1:00, pa2 = pb2 = 1:25, "a = "b = 0:4,
 = 1, na = nb = :5,  = 1:3,  = 1:8, 1 = 0:45, 2 = 0:55.
Table A.2: Optimal vertical equalization with lobbying at the local level.
as:
Qij() = iniwij(t
()),
where welfare wij(:) is dened in Eqs. (A.1)-(A.2). In the aggregate:
Q() =
2X
j=1
X
i2fa;bg
Qij() =
2X
j=1
Qj ().
Given that:
@Q1
@i
=  izi1
@ti1
@i
+ 
@T 1
@i
+ (   1)@E

1
@i
,
@Q2
@i
=  2@E

1
@i
,
after some manipulations we get the following derivative, which is the equivalent of
derivative (30) in the article for horizontal equalization:
2X
j=1
@Qj
@i
= (   ) (zi   zi1)

ti + i
@ti
@ti1
@ti1
@i

+
 i  

1 + 
zi1
@ti1
@i
  ( + ) z

i1
2
it

i "i
1  ti1
@ti1
@i
. (A.5)
The derivative in Eq. (A.5) shows how lobbying at the central level can distort
the choice of the equalization rates, whose optimal determination is governed by the
derivative of social welfare given in Eq. (A.4). Note rst that the second term in
derivative (A.5) cancels out with the corresponding term in derivative (A.4). This
4
Model a b Lobbying 

a 

b t

a1 t

a2 t

b1 t

b2 W

1 W

2 W

I.0 0.2 0.2 only local .55 .55 .51 .37 .51 .37 1.411 1.532 2.944
local and central .34 .34 .45 .37 .45 .37 1.410 1.543 2.953
I.1 0.2 0.4 only local .29 .83 .50 .42 .52 .30 1.412 1.530 2.942
local and central .24 .32 .48 .42 .37 .30 1.409 1.545 2.954
I.2 0.2 0.6 only local .09 1.00 .48 .46 .48 .23 1.413 1.529 2.942
local and central .17 .32 .50 .46 .29 .23 1.406 1.543 2.950
I.3 0.2 1.0 only local .00 1.00 .51 .51 .21 .08 1.404 1.530 2.934
local and central .08 .43 .54 .51 .13 .09 1.397 1.534 2.931
Other parameters as in Table A.2.
Table A.3: Vertical equalization with lobbying at the local and central level.
means that with lobbying at the central level there are no distortions of the equalization
rates due to heterogeneity in lobbying power, as measured by the di¤erence i  , but
only distortions due to the average power of the lobby groups, as measured by the
parameter . That is, lobbying at the central level distorts the choices of the central
policy maker towards a less egalitarian, hence more e¢ ciency oriented, equalization
policy.
The comparison of Table A.3 with Table 3 in the article shows that lobbying at the
local and at the central level impact in a similar way on the structure of the two types
of equalization schemes. If groups a and b are similar in terms of lobbying power, then
lobbying at the central level distorts downward both equalization rates. If, instead, the
two groups are highly heterogeneous in terms of lobbying power, then the central gov-
ernment is induced to distort upward the equalization rate on the less powerful group,
downward on the more powerful one. When lobbying at the central level is highly dis-
tortionary, uniform equalization may then perform better than di¤erential equalization
also with a vertical scheme, as shown in the article for horizontal equalization.
B. Mobility of production factors
We now generalize our model by allowing for mobility of production factors. In partic-
ular, we continue to assume that the place of residence is xed for all agents. However,
agents now have the option to commute to another locality to supply their production
factor and earn their income. Local income taxes are applied on a residence basis, an
5
arrangement widely employed at sub-national levels of government.1 Also, we examine
only the case of horizontal equalization.
We consider imperfect mobility by assuming that an agent supplying her production
factor in a foreignlocality sustains a lump sum cost , with  distributed within the
group of type-i agents according to the density function fi()  0 on the support
 = [0;+1), with cumulative distribution denoted by Fi(). The cost  can be
interpreted as the per period monetary (e.g., travel expenses) and non-monetary (e.g.,
time spent travelling) costs of commuting.
Under residence taxation, no agent has incentives to commute to a foreign locality
of the same type, since commuting implies mobility costs but no income gain. It is
also never protable to commute from a rich to a poor locality. Mobility can instead
be protable for agents resident in type-1, poor, localities, since by commuting to a
type-2, rich, locality they can take home higher net earnings. Therefore, in the present
setting, mobility occurs only from poor to rich localities.
In order to focus on symmetric equilibria under agentsmobility, we assume that
each type-1 locality is connectedwith only one type-2 locality, and viceversa (recall
that there is an identical and large number J > 1 of localities of each type). Hence, the
agents who are resident in a given type-1 locality have the opportunity to supply their
own production factor either at homeor abroad, in another, and only one, type-2
locality.
Consider a type-(i; ) agent who is resident in a type-1 locality: 1 denotes the
home-poorlocality and 2 the connected foreign-richlocality. The agent chooses to
supply at home if vi1(ti1)  v^i2(ti1) , and abroad otherwise, where vij is the indirect
utility function dened in Eq. (5) of the article,
vi1(ti1) = (1  ti1)pi1~xi1(pi1; ti1) + i (1  ~xi1(pi1; ti1)) , (B.1)
v^i2(ti1) = (1  ti1)pi2x^i2(pi2; ti1) + i (1  x^i2(pi2; ti1)) , (B.2)
and where x^i2 is the supply in a type-2 locality of a type-i agent resident in a type-
1 locality (a commuter), while ~xi1 is the supply at home. Since, by Assumption 1,
pi1 < pi2, and supply is upward sloping, it is ~xi1 < x^i2: supply is higher abroad
than at home, because productivity abroad is higher than at home. Hence, v^i2 > vi1,
pi2x^i2 > pi1~xi1.
Note that the choice of whether to supply at home or abroad is made by compar-
ing only the private components, vi1 and v^i2, of individual welfare. That is, we are
1 In Italy, for instance, the regional and the municipal surcharge tax on the personal income tax is
applied on a residence basis. See the working paper version of this paper (Esteller-Moré et al., 2015),
for an analysis of production factors mobility under taxation at source.
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assuming that commuters enjoy only the public goods provided at home, in their place
of residence, while they do not consume those provided abroad, where they earn their
income.
The mass of type-i agents resident in a poor locality and commuting to a rich
locality is equal to:
mi1(ti1) = niFi(v^i2   vi1) > 0,
while that of those supplying at home is equal to ni  mi1(ti1).
If taxation in a poor locality is increased, the number of commuters declines, since:
@mi1
@ti1
=  nifi(v^i2   vi1) (pi2x^i2   pi1~xi1) < 0.
The reason is that an increase in taxation a¤ects more severely welfare of commuters
than that of non-commuters:
@v^i2
@ti1
=  pi2x^i2 <  pi1~xi1 = @vi1
@ti1
< 0. (B.3)
Because of factorsmobility, Eq. (7) in the article, dening the per capita tax base
of production factor k in a type-1 jurisdiction, is modied as follows:
zk1 = nkpk1~xk1 +mk1 (pk2x^k2   pk1~xk1) , (B.4)
The rst term in Eq. (B.2) is income, or tax base, in the absence of mobility; the
second term represents the extra income earned by commuters that supply in the more
productive type-2 locality. The per capita tax base of production factor k in a type-2
jurisdiction is the same as in Eq. (7) of the article, since there are no commuters from
type-2 to type-1 localities.
An increase in taxation in a type-1 locality a¤ects its tax base on production factor
k as follows:
@zk1
@tk1
=   zk1"k
1  tk1 + (pk2x^k2   pk1~xk1)
@mk1
@tk1
. (B.5)
The rst term is the behavioral e¤ect due to the elasticity of production factors sup-
ply. The second term is the behavioral e¤ect due to the reduction in the number of
commuters.
B.1 Equilibrium tax rates
The determination of tax policy by local governments is una¤ected by factorsmobility
for type-2 localities, since none of its residents commutes. Hence, we focus on the
determination of tax policy in type-1 localities.
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Using Eq. (B.5), for a type-1 locality, an increase in its own tax rate ti1 impacts
on tax tax revenues and equalization grants as follows (recall that each locality takes
as given the average tax rate and tax base at the national level):
@T1
@ti1
+
@E1
@ti1
= zi1

1  (ti1   iti)

"i
1  ti1  
i(ti1)
mi1
@mi1
@ti1

, (B.6)
where
i(ti1) =
mi1 (pi2x^i2   pi1~xi1)
zi1
,
represents the incidence on total income zi1 of the extra income that type-i agents
resident in a type-1 locality earn by commuting in a type-2 locality.
Type-(i; ) agents resident in a type-1 locality are divided into two groups: that of
those supplying at home, with commuting cost   v^k2   vk1, of mass ni  mi1, with
welfare:
wi1(t1) = vi1(ti1) +  [T1(t1) + E1(t1)] ,
and that of those supplying abroad,  < v^k2   vk1, of mass mi1, with welfare:
w^i1(t1) = v^i2(ti1)  +  [T1(t1) + E1(t1)] .
Per capita social welfare in a type-1 locality is thus equal to:
W1(t1) =
X
k2fa;bg
nk
Z v^k2 vk1
0
(v^k2   ) dFk +
Z 1
v^k2 vk1
vk1 dFk +  (T1 + E1)

.
We assume that only the resident agents lobby their own local policy maker. In
fact, residents in a type-1 locality commuting to a type-2 locality have no incentives
to lobby the policy maker abroad, since their income earned abroad is taxed at home
and public goods are enjoyed at home. Under the inuence of lobbying, the objective
function of the local policy maker of a type-1 locality is equal to:

1(t1) =
X
k2fa;bg
(1+k)nk
Z v^k2 vk1
0
(v^k2   ) dFk +
Z 1
v^k2 vk1
vk1 dFk +  (T1 + E1)

.
(B.7)
The rst order condition for maximizing Eq. (B.7) with respect to tax rate ti1 is
equal to:
@
1
@ti1
= (1+i)ni
Z v^k2 vk1
0
@v^i2
@ti1
dFk +
Z 1
v^k2 vk1
@vi1
@ti1
dFk

+(1+)

@T1
@ti1
+
@E1
@ti1

= 0.
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(B.8)
Using Eqs. (B.3) and (B.4), Eq. (B.8) can be written as:
@
1
@ti1
=  (1 + i)zi1 + (1 + )

@T1
@ti1
+
@E1
@ti1

= 0.
Finally, using Eq. (B.6), the condition characterizing the choice of tax rate ti1 by a
type-1 locality is given by:
ti1   iti
1  ti1 =
   (1 + i)=(1 + )


"i   (1  ti1)i(ti1)
mi1
@mi1
@ti1
 . (B.9)
The corresponding condition for a type-2 locality is equal to that reported in the
article at Eq. (18), that is:
ti2   iti
1  ti2 =
   (1 + i)=(1 + )
"i
. (B.10)
Eqs. (B.9)-(B.10) simultaneously dene the equilibrium tax rates (ti1; t

i2) on tax
base i. Note that, while in the absence of mobility it is ti1 = t

i2, since the right hand
sides of Eqs. (B.9)-(B.10) are identical, in the presence of commuters from type-1 to
type-2 localities it is ti1 < t

i2. The reason is simple. When a type-1, poor, locality,
increases taxation, some of its residents decide to drop commuting to a type-2 rich
locality. Hence, because of mobility, the tax base of a type-1 locality is more elastic
than the corresponding tax base of a type-2 locality. The elasticity due to mobility is
seen in Eq. (B.9) as the second term in the denominator of the right hand side of the
equation.
B.2 Fiscal equalization under tax base mobility
We do not formally derive, as in the article, the rst order conditions for the optimal
equalization rates in the presence of lobbying at the local level, neither those for the
equilibrium equalization rates with lobbying at both levels of government. We only
replicate the numerical simulations presented in the article with the added feature of
tax base mobility.
By comparing Table B.1 with Table 1 in the article, we see that factorsmobility
reduces the optimal equalization rates from above to below 50% in all model specica-
tions. With factorsmobility there is less need for inter-regional redistribution, since
people commuting from poor to rich localities (in the simulations, about 20-30% of the
residents commute) determine a reduction in the income gap between poor and rich
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Model pa1 pa2 pb1 pb2 "a "b 

a 

b t

a1 t

a2 t

b1 t

b2 W

1 W

2 W
 ma1 m

b1
I.0 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.25 0.4 0.4   .30 .37 .30 .37 1.435 1.556 2.991 .14 .14
.40 .40 .44 .48 .44 .48 1.441 1.537 2.978 .10 .10
II.0 1.00 1.30 1.00 1.22 0.2 0.6   .39 .54 .25 .28 1.504 1.634 3.138 .20 .09
.39 .41 .56 .65 .37 .39 1.510 1.614 3.124 .14 .07
III.0 1.00 1.25 1.00 1.50 0.4 0.4   .30 .37 .21 .37 1.487 1.636 3.124 .14 .34
.40 .19 .44 .48 .26 .41 1.491 1.625 3.116 .10 .31
Other parameters: a = b = 0,  = 1, na = nb = :5,  = 1:3,  uniform on [0; 0:3].
Table B.1: Optimal equalization in the absence of lobbying (mobility).
Model a b 

a 

b t

a1 t

a2 t

b1 t

b2 W

1 W

2 W
 ma1 m

b1
I.0 0.2 0.2   .30 .37 .30 .37 1.435 1.556 2.991 .14 .14
.40 .40 .44 .48 .44 .48 1.441 1.537 2.978 .10 .10
I.1 0.2 0.4   .36 .42 .24 .30 1.434 1.554 2.988 .12 .16
.26 .54 .45 .49 .44 .47 1.441 1.537 2.978 .10 .10
I.2 0.2 0.6   .40 .46 .18 .23 1.431 1.551 2.982 .11 .17
.15 .66 .45 .50 .43 .46 1.442 1.537 2.978 .10 .10
I.3 0.2 1.0   .46 .51 .06 .09 1.422 1.538 2.960 .10 .21
.00 .88 .46 .51 .42 .43 1.443 1.535 2.978 .10 .10
Other parameters: pa1 = pb1 = 1:00, pa2 = pb2 = 1:25, "a = "b = 0:4,
 = 1, na = nb = :5,  = 1:3,  uniform on [0; 0:3].
Table B.2: Optimal equalization with lobbying at the local level (mobility).
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Model a b Lobbying 

a 

b t

a1 t

a2 t

b1 t

b2 W

1 W

2 W
 ma1 m

b1
I.0 0.2 0.2 only local .40 .40 .44 .48 .44 .48 1.441 1.537 2.978 .10 .10
local and central .31 .31 .40 .45 .40 .45 1.440 1.544 2.984 .11 .11
I.1 0.2 0.4 only local .26 .54 .45 .49 .44 .47 1.441 1.537 2.978 .10 .10
local and central .33 .18 .47 .51 .28 .34 1.437 1.543 2.981 .09 .14
I.2 0.2 0.6 only local .15 .66 .45 .50 .43 .46 1.442 1.537 2.978 .10 .10
local and centra l .33 .00 .52 .55 .18 .23 1.431 1.538 2.969 .08 .17
I.3 0.2 1.0 only local .00 .88 .46 .51 .42 .43 1.443 1.535 2.978 .10 .10
local and central .31 .00 .57 .60 .06 .09 1.420 1.524 2.943 .07 .21
Other parameters as in Table B.2.
Table B.3: Equalization with lobbying at the local and central level (mobility).
localities. Fiscal equalization, by reducing the average income gaps between poor and
rich localities, discourages commuting.
The comparison of Table B.2 with Table 2 in the article shows that lobbying at the
local level impacts in a similar way on the optimal structure of the equalization rates
with and without tax base mobility. As groups a and b become more heterogeneous
in terms of lobbying power, the optimal equalization rate increases for the tax base
backed by the more powerful group b and it lowers for that backed by the less powerful
group a.
Finally, the comparison of Table B.3 with Table 3 in the article shows that lobbying
at the local and at the central level impact in a similar way on the equilibrium structure
of the equalization rates with and without tax base mobility.
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